Six FTC-2000G fighter jets from China arrived in Myanmar in August, coinciding with the military junta’s intensifying airstrikes against armed rebels of various ethnic groups. This followed high-level meetings between Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi and junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, signalling Beijing’s continued support for Myanmar’s military, even amid mounting internal resistance. Developed by Guizhou Aviation, the FTC-2000G is a versatile aircraft used for attack, surveillance and other missions, but is said to be vulnerable at low altitudes.
Part of a 2020 order delayed by the Covid pandemic, the arrival of the jets underscores the growing military cooperation between the regimes in the two countries as well as Beijing’s deepening influence on India’s eastern border. China’s strategic access to Myanmar, through projects like the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, threatens to encircle India, limiting its influence in South and Southeast Asia. India has maintained a delicate balance, engaging with both the military regime and the ethnic groups in Myanmar to protect its strategic interests.
With growing Chinese influence in Myanmar, India faces strategic challenges, particularly as Beijing strengthens ties with a regime under international scrutiny. China’s backing of the junta, including the supply of arms and ammunition, has deepened over time, with drones and other weaponry now aiding the regime’s efforts against ethnic forces. This military reinforcement is a key concern for India, which shares a 1,643 km border with Myanmar and has faced the spillover effects of instability, particularly in the Northeast ravaged by several insurgencies. As the junta may turn a blind eye to these insurgent groups, China’s enhanced military support complicates India’s efforts to secure its borders. With the situation in Nagaland and Manipur already sensitive, further militarisation of Myanmar’s border could worsen the situation.
Moreover, the ethnic armed groups in Myanmar have historical ties to India’s northeastern insurgents, raising concerns about a resurgence of violence and arms trafficking as the India-Myanmar border is largely unguarded. Observers in New Delhi fear the rising possibility of Chinese weapons entering India’s northeastern states through the porous border.
The Chinese support comes at a time when the junta is losing control over key areas, especially in northern Shan State, where ethnic forces have seized towns and trade routes, impacting Chinese commerce. Deputy junta leader Soe Win’s recent visit to China highlights his focus on acquiring more arms amid heavy losses on the battlefield.
For India, this growing China-Myanmar military nexus, along with the presence of Chinese-funded infrastructure projects near India’s border, adds to regional security concerns. Chinese-built projects like the Kyaukphyu port and the Myitsone dam, despite facing setbacks, remain crucial to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), giving China greater strategic access to the Indian Ocean.
China’s growing investments in Myanmar, coupled with its post-pandemic economic slowdown, also pose economic risks for India. As Myanmar becomes a critical part of China’s broader strategic ambitions, India’s own connectivity projects, like the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway, could face disruptions. Myanmar’s political instability directly affects India’s Act East policy, which aims to enhance trade and connectivity with Southeast Asia. Moreover, instability in Myanmar could hurt trade via the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, a key initiative for Northeast India.
An equally concerning issue for India is the rise of online scam centres in Myanmar, many of which are operated by Chinese-led criminal networks. These operations have seen significant growth since the junta’s takeover, with over $15.3 billionâalmost one-fourth of Myanmar’s GDPâgenerated by such scams in 2023 alone. The fraudulent job offers and financial scams originating from these networks also target unsuspecting people in India.
China’s response to these crimes, including initiatives like Operation 1027 aimed at dismantling the scam centres, indicates Beijing’s concerns about domestic security. However, its broader approach to Myanmar remains state-centred, maintaining ties with the junta despite the regime’s territorial losses. For India, this creates a dilemma. While China engages with the junta to protect its investments and strategic interests, India must navigate a complex regional environment where its own security and developmental projects are directly impacted by Myanmar’s internal instability and Chinese influence.
China’s involvement in Myanmar is likely to intensify in the coming years, especially with the junta announcing general elections in 2025. China’s cautious response to junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s growing ties with Moscow signals its unease with Myanmar’s potential shift away from reliance on Beijing. For India, any reduction in Chinese influence could create new opportunities to reassert its presence in Myanmar. However, so long as China remains the dominant foreign player, India must contend with the security implications of Chinese arms supplies to the junta and the growing militarisation of its shared border. As China continues to prioritise its economic and strategic interests in Myanmar, India must remain vigilant, balancing its own security concerns while seeking to maintain stability in its northeastern region.
